THE MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION

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Abstract

   The article investigates the modern philosophical discourse of the problem of recognition in the socio-anthropological measurements, in the context of the relationship between recognition, the "living world" and justice, non-recognition, humiliation of human dignity, and injustice. And it was also found that the image of recognition represented by modern philosophical thought, as a horizon and condition of human existence, is based on the following components: justice, solidarity, dignity, and care. Exactly addressing the problem of recognition made it possible to answer the question about the anthropological-ontological, existential meaning of the desire of individuals, nations, and states for recognition and outline the ways of transforming recognition as a variant of "communicative utopia" into a real socio-cultural project.

Keywords: *recognition, justice, injustice, humiliation, trust, dignity.*

INTRODUCTION

   The tragic events in Ukraine in recent years have made it understand that the human attitude of people to each other requires special virtues, especially - a sense of justice, recognition and respect for human dignity. We must assume that recognition is one of the leading places among other moral and social values: it is one that people must take into account in their relationships because, without recognition, social relations lose any sense. The article analyzes the latest philosophical discourses of recognition in the context of understanding injustice, and various "abnormalities" of social life. It also shows the complementarity of the intersubjective realistic concept of recognition of Axel Honneth and the critically configured model of recognition of Stefan Gosepath. The sociocultural origins and peculiarities of the theory of recognition are identified and it is proved that modern practical philosophy advocates the fruitfulness of supplementing the moral principle of equal attitude to people by the norm of a definite duty to an individual and aimed at searching for overcoming of various forms of non-recognition, indignity, and contempt for human dignity.

EXPOSITION

   In order to understand the social dynamics of disrespect, and injustice, Honneth identifies three main forms of recognition, which define a person's sense of his individual and social spaces as fair, or vice versa – unjust, one where his dignity is despised. If we are talking about the first individual level, it is love, at the social level we can talk about law and solidarity. In addition, Honneth emphasizes that these forms of recognition have both positive (as a condition for the possibility of self-realization as an individual) and negative (as a precaution against individual and social distortions and injustices) meanings.

   The German philosopher concluding his "The Struggle for Recognition" [1, p. 274-287] draws attention to the ways of recognition as algorithms of free and fair behaviour, which help not only to overcome loneliness but also to use the positive potential of law and solidarity as kinds of synthesis of independence and rootedness. However, as further investigations by

Honneth testify, it is neglect, and backwardness as a form of personal, institutional, and cultural-historical injustice, that become the subject of his careful analysis. However, as further investigations by Honneth testify, it is contempt, and backwardness as a form of personal, institutional, and cultural-historical injustice, that become the subject of his careful analysis. He emphasizes the close connection between personal (we will add collective) identity with the processes of its neglect. It goes primarily about an extreme form of social injustice, about violence, as a threat to the simple survival of a man, which is embodied in the assault on his life and the ability to freely dispose of his body. This first of the forms of neglect analysed by Honneth as the forcible deprivation of a man of the right to be a free corporeal being has the negative consequence of destroying trust both in him and in the world. Injustice in the form of contempt for a person as a bearer of fundamental rights (up to their deprivation) and ignoring his belonging to a community, which is interpreted as a disadvantaged community, also has a deep negative ontological meaning. Injustice in the form of contempt for a person as a host of fundamental rights (up to their deprivation) and ignoring his belonging to a community, which is interpreted as a community of the second kind, also has a deep negative ontological meaning. Destructive and painful for a modern man is individual injustice, which implements itself in the inability to gain recognition at the level of its specific achievements and individual characteristics and is accompanied by loss of personal dignity and inability to have adequate self-esteem [1, p. 211]. The main thing that A. Honneth emphasizes is that the awareness of the injustice of the above-mentioned forms of contempt has both moral and social meanings. So it is not so much the material as the moral and socio-cultural tension of social conflicts that becomes the basis of the collective struggle for justice.

Stefan Gosepath, a Professor of Practical Philosophy at the Free University of Berlin, does not accidentally begin his answer to the question of why people tend to seek justice and seek recognition with the possibility of substantiating social human rights as an essential component of human rights in general. Gosepath is gradually developing the thesis that people have a moral right to be treated with equal respect. In this context, Gosepath's interpretation of human autonomy in the broadest sense of the word deserves special attention as to general personal self-determination of how a person wants to live his life. It should be underlined that Gosepath forms his practical philosophy in a constructive theoretical dialogue with A. Honneth and Ch. Taylor.

Developing his concept of substantiating the principles of "Liberal Egalitarianism", Gosepath relies on the thoughts of the classic German philosophy E. Tugendhat, who claims that without the recognition of members of the moral community as fundamentally equal, there is no way to develop moral sense and feeling. It goes about justifying moral features not only for me, but also about their mutual justification, that is, "about a relationship in which no one can do what he wants, or what is best for him, and all together create a system of regulations that, although it limits the autonomy of everyone, through the limits of the autonomy of everyone else" [2, p. 25]. Tugendhat, adhering to the principle of universalization as the recognition of a norm to be just or justified, rejects the cognitive assumptions of the ethics of discourse and its objections to monologism. He, like J. Habermas and O. Höffe, believes that the philosophy of justice, as well as modern practical philosophy in general, should act therapeutically and against the injustices of individual and social life to use the healing power of reflection to find conditions for a just solution to conflict situations.

Stefan Gozepath himself is going, and he must go further in his project, the image of

justice. In fact, equality and justice are so closely linked that justice is most often associated with equality, and injustice with inequality. However, a closer look at the problem denies this apparent simplicity, and many cases of inequality seem quite fair to us. For Gozepath, the presumption of equality became also an opportunity to take the next step, which is to build a convincing theory of distributive justice that would help determine what and by whom it is distributed and on what basis. An important feature of Gozepath's discourse of justice is also the clear formulation of the basic approaches to its understanding inherent in modern German philosophy, which can be described as the acquiring of justice by a new sociocultural dimension and the transformation of a man from an object to a subject of justice. It is going about initiated by Rainer Forst in the "Contexts of Justice" and finished in one of his works under the title "Right to Justification. Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice" [3] thesis concerning justice as a universal and fundamental right of every person to justify certain social norms and actions.

Gozepath formulates his vision of the relationship between justice and recognition in the context of answering the question: if justice has a prominent place among other moral and social values, then how to deal with equality, where is its place? After all, justice is not just a moral value that coexists with other values, such as freedom, community, or moral relationships, but the scale by which the basic components of our existence are measured. The peculiarity of Gozepath's approach and his merit is the substantiation of the primordial nature, the value of justice, and its advantages over other moral and social values. And this is fundamentally important if we interpret justice as the existential human existence. And the desire for justice is the desire for recognition and self-realization as intersubjective principles of identity creation. The theory of justice should perceive the theory of recognition as a deep, but partial, image of the individual. It

is no coincidence that Gozepath's understanding of morality as a whole encompasses, along with justice, "other justice", but justice has advantages over its moral rivals - the ethics of care and recognition. Thus, the theory of recognition, the ethics of care, and the theory of justice do not compete with each other but belong to different dimensions of human existence.

Gozepath tells about the difference between care and justice: if justice insists on the doctrine of moral principles, care requires the development of moral dispositions. The next difference concerns the form of moral thinking: from the point of view of justice, the problems must be solved with the help of moral principles; care is shown in each separate case. And the third difference concerns moral orientation: justice focuses on rights and honesty, and care does on responsibility and personal relationships. Agreeing with the opinion of A. Honneth and Ch. Taylor about recognition as a universal human need, Gozepath tries not to talk about the dilemma of justice and recognition, initiated by the famous discussion of A. Honneth and N. Fraser. He believes that recognition is a significant prospect for the theory of justice. However, recognition is not a good that can be distributed: "Not everyone receives an equal right to public respect, because then that respect will have no value. However, everyone (on fair equal terms) must receive an equal right to the opportunity to achieve public respect and recognition" [4, p. 106].

However, S. Gozepath, postulating the distributive concept of social justice, ignores the one who distributes wealth, as well as the fact that injustice, humiliation and poverty are primarily the result of economic and political abuse. After all, the first question of justice is a question of power, human dignity is violated when a person only receives his, appointed from above, a share of justice, and does not create it independently, as well as his being in general.

CONCLUSION

The article accounts for the recognition itself as an existential need of a person, because s/he forms his/her identity in dialogue and struggles with "significant others". Recognition also determines the self-realization of the individual, as well as the fundamental "vulnerability" of human existence. And most importantly, it emphasizes that the contempt for man and his/her life world destroys the basis of the constitution of his/her identity, becomes a cause of social conflict, and is the most painful embodiment of social injustice. In addition, our dignity depends on the recognition of us by other people, and humiliation, disrespect, and non-recognition not only reduce our self-esteem, but it appears to be unfair. Moreover outlined in the famous discussion of liberalism and communitarism of practical philosophy strive to highlight the ways of theoretical understanding and provide practical recipes for overcoming dilemma between individual and community.

Summing up the understanding of the problem of recognition in modern practical philosophy, it should be emphasized that it is not so much an attempt to develop a theory of recognition in the stream of action theory and epistemology. It is about identifying the inner potential of the phenomenon of recognition. That is to investigate the fundamental possibility of reconciling the formal-legitimate, institutional structures of recognition with the understanding of them as structures, which are justified or truly legitimated by us, the citizens in our social practices. The latest philosophical discourse of recognition transforms the theory of recognition from utopia into a realistic project, namely, considers recognition as the horizon and condition of human existence. This transformation is based on three components: justice as a formally equal treatment of people; solidarity; dignity and care. Further theoretical and practical steps to study the multidimensional phenomenon of recognition should be complemented by addressing the problem of identity, as well as, the issue of meaning of human life. The only recourse to the "canvas of recognition" in people's lifeworld is able to bridge the gap between philosophical reflections, political practices, and personal life experiences. And also not to allow to go beyond "forgetting recognition" as a way to "forgetting being".

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